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a b s t r a c t 
We investigate the effects of the announcement and the disclosure of the clarification, methodology, and 
outcomes of the U.S. banking stress tests on banks’ equity prices, credit risk, systematic risk, and systemic 
risk. We find evidence that stress tests have moved stock and credit markets following the disclosure of 
stress test results. We also find that banks’ systematic risk, as measured by betas, declined in nearly all 
years after the publication of stress test results. Our evidence suggests that stress tests affect systemic 
risk. 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 




































Stress testing has become an important tool for bank
upervisors. In stress tests, the implications for individual
anks’ financial positions under several macroeconomic scenar-
os are examined taking the banks’ exposures and business
odels into account. Stress tests may affect bank behavior.
charya et al. (2018) conclude that stress tests result in safer banks
n terms of capital ratios and risk-weighted asset ratios. However,
lannery et al. (2017) find no evidence that stress tested banks
ignificantly change their loan portfolio composition in response
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omments and discussions. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views 
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nces between U.S. banks involved in stress tests and those not
nvolved in stress tests. They find that stress tested banks lower
ividends significantly more than non-stress tested banks. Finally,
anks involved in stress test spend significantly more on lobbying.
ohn and Liang (2019) review the experience with stress testing in
he US. They conclude that stress tests have helped to counter pro-
yclicality of bank capital and that stress tests improved risk man-
gement and capital planning at tested institutions. Furthermore,
ested banks increased loan spreads relative to non-tested banks
nd reduced the availability of loans, most particularly riskier
nes. 
Stress tests have several characteristics ( Goldstein and Sapra,
014 ). First, they are forward looking. Second, they generally put
uch weight on highly adverse scenarios, thereby providing su-
ervisors with information about tail risks. Third, common sce-
arios are applied to banks so that consistent supervisory stan-
ards across banks are applied. Finally, unlike traditional super-
isory examinations that generally are kept confidential, the re-
ults of bank stress tests are frequently publicly disclosed in order
o restore confidence and reduce market uncertainty ( Federal Re-
erve, 2009b ). It is widely believed that U.S. stress tests have pro-
ided valuable information to the market. Referring to post-crisis
tress tests then Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke stated: nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 






















































































































v  ”Even outside of a period of crisis, the disclosure of stress test
results and assessments provides valuable information to mar-
ket participants and the public, enhances transparency, and pro-
motes market discipline” ( Bernanke, 2013 ) . 
However, Goldstein and Sapra, 2014 argue that while stress
tests uncover unique information to outsiders, there are also po-
tential endogenous costs associated with such disclosure. For in-
stance, disclosure might interfere with the operation of the in-
terbank market and the risk sharing provided in this market. It
may also induce sub-optimal behavior by banks which will de-
velop an incentive to pass the tests rather than engage in prudent
risk-taking behavior. Other potential adverse implications of dis-
closure on market operations include panics among bank creditors
and other bank counterparties and reduction in information aggre-
gation and processing in the market. This implies that there is no
optimal disclosure strategy. 
This paper examines the impact of banking stress tests in the
U.S. on banks’ stock prices, CDS spreads, systematic risk (proxied
by banks’ betas), and “systemic risk” over the 2009–15 period. We
consider the effects of the disclosure of stress test outcomes, but
also analyze the financial market impact of the disclosure of other
information about stress tests, such as their announcement and the
disclosure of the stress test methodology. The first test considered
is the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) of the 19
largest Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). 1 The outcomes of this test
were disclosed on May 7, 2009. Since then the Federal Reserve im-
plemented two supervisory programs. The first program, the Com-
prehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), assesses the capi-
tal planning processes and capital adequacy of banks and has been
conducted annually since 2011. The CCAR combines quantitative
stress test results with qualitative assessments of capital planning
processes of banks. The second program stems from the Dodd-
Frank Act and requires assessing how bank capital levels would
fare in stressful scenarios ( Federal Reserve, 2013b ). The first Dodd-
Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) results were publicly released on
March 7, 2013. Our research distinguishes analytically between the
DFAST and CCAR exercises as the underlying assumptions between
the tests differ and, consequently, the weight attached to their re-
sults by market participants might differ. For example, while DFAST
was conducted conditional on no change in banks’ capital distribu-
tions, CCAR incorporated the capital plans proposed by the banks
and, therefore, may have better reflected banks’ creditworthiness
( Federal Reserve, 2013a ). 
Theoretically, the market reaction to the disclosure of stress test
information is not clear a priori. First, the response may depend on
the type of information being disclosed ( Petrella and Resti, 2013 ).
For instance, markets may respond differently to the announce-
ment of a stress test than to the publication of the outcomes of a
stress test. Second, the circumstances under which the stress test
has been performed may affect how markets respond, notably to
the disclosure of the stress test results. For instance, during finan-
cial crises there is much more uncertainty about the quality and
hence valuation of assets held by banks than under normal cir-
cumstances ( Schuermann, 2014 ). This implies that under crisis cir-
cumstances, the release of information about individual banks may
provide news to which markets respond. Under normal circum-
stances, the release of stress test outcomes may not surprise mar-
kets. Indeed, Ahnert et al. (2018) find that the outcomes of stress
tests are to a large extent predictable. These authors report that
a bank’s asset quality and its return of equity are significant pre-1 We refer to BHCs as large banks. The size of the banks varies between the SCAP 
and subsequent stress tests. In 2009 all banks having total consolidated assets of 
$100 bln or more were subject to stress testing. In subsequent years the size was 





ictors of the pass or fail stress test outcome of a bank. They also
nd that banks with a higher capital buffer, higher asset quality,
ower leverage, and a less risky business model earn higher ab-
ormal equity returns at the stress test release. Finally, stock and
DS markets may react differently because stock holders and cred-
tors may have different incentives with respect to the disclosure
f stress test information ( Georgescu et al., 2017 ). These authors
eport a disconnect between the stock market and the CDS mar-
et after the publication of the outcomes of the European Central
ank’s (ECB) Comprehensive Assessment in 2014. 
Our research adds to the literature in three ways. Our first
ontribution is that we use an event study approach to examine
he effects of post-crisis stress tests in the U.S. over the period
009–2015. We distinguish between the effects on banks that had
 capital shortfall and those that passed the test (gap and no-
ap banks); see also Ahnert et al. (2018) . We also examine the
mpact of the disclosure of stress test information on individual
anks’ stock prices and CDS spreads. Several previous studies have
lso analyzed financial market effects of the disclosure of stress
est outcomes (see Section 2 for an extensive discussion of pre-
ious research). The papers that come closest to our research are
lannery et al. (2017) and Fernandes et al., 2017 , who also consider
 wide range of U.S. stress tests over the period 2009–15. In fact,
e use the sample period 2009–2015 to make our results compa-
able to these studies. In contrast to these studies, we also exam-
ne the impact of the disclosure of stress test information on sys-
ematic and “systemic risk” (see below). Furthermore, these stud-
es neither examine differences between gap and no-gap banks nor
he impact of the disclosure of stress tests information on individ-
al banks’ stock prices and CDS spreads ( Ahnert et al. (2018) also
onsider CDS spreads). 2 
Our second contribution is that we not only examine market re-
ctions to the disclosure of stress test outcomes, but also analyze
he financial market impact of the disclosure of other information
bout stress tests, like their announcement (see also Ahnert et al.,
018 ) and the disclosure of the stress test methodology. This is im-
ortant as these events may also provide information to markets
 Gick and Pausch, 2012; Petrella and Resti, 2013 ). 
Our third contribution is that in contrast to previous research,
ur analysis is not confined to the effects of the disclosure of stress
est information on equity returns and CDS spreads but also con-
iders the impact of stress tests on bank betas. Betas capture sys-
ematic risk based on the co-movement of returns with the over-
ll market and are therefore particularly relevant for understand-
ng the effects of stress tests. In addition, we study whether the
hange in betas is due to changes in individual bank risk, or due
o changes in “systemic risk” following the approach suggested by
ijskens and Wagner (2011) . (We write “systemic risk” to distin-
uish this approach from proposed measures of systemic risk as
iscussed in Section 4 .) 
As will be pointed out in more detail in Section 2 , our paper
s related to three strands of literature. The first strand examines
hether information provided by the disclosure of the outcomes
f stress tests reduces the opacity of banks ( Beltratti, 2011; Ellahie,
012; Fernandes et al., 2017; Flannery et al., 2017; Morgan et al.,
014; Petrella and Resti, 2013 ). Most (but not all) studies conclude
hat stress tests produce (some) valuable information for market
articipants and can play a role in mitigating bank opacity. The
econd strand of related literature examines to what extent super-
isory information should be disclosed (e.g. Goldstein and Sapra,
014; Schuermann, 2014 ). Several of these studies conclude that
t may not always be optimal to fully disclose stress test results.2 We like to stress that as our analysis is based on an event study approach, like 
ost previous studies in this line of research, it suffers from the shortcomings of 
his approach as discussed by MacKinlay (1997) . 























































































































3 Philippon et al. (2017) provide an evaluation of the quality of banking stress 
tests in the European Union. They conclude that stress test model-based losses are 
good predictors of realized losses and of banks’ equity returns around announce- 
ments of macroeconomic news. Furthermore, they do not detect biases in the con- 
struction of the scenarios, or in the estimated losses across banks of different sizes 
and ownership structures. 
4 Goldstein and Sapra, 2014 argue that the public disclosure of stress test re- 
sults may drive out private information producers (such as stock analysts). However, 
Fernandes et al., 2017 conclude that the public disclosure of the stress test results 
(and methodology) does not seem to have reduced private incentives to generate 
information, while Flannery et al. (2017) find no evidence of reduced equity ana- 
lysts’ coverage or deterioration in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. he final related strand of literature examines how stress tests can
e used to set capital ratios, limit capital distributions, and set-up
esolution regimes in case of financial distress ( BCBS, 2012 ). 
Our findings suggest that the release of stress test information
as occasionally affected stock and credit markets. Stock markets
eacted overall positively to the release of information concern-
ng the results of a stress test while credit markets consistently
how declines in CDS spreads. Moreover, in comparison with the
CAP, post-crisis stress tests show smaller effects and are statisti-
ally weaker. We find mixed results for the release of other stress
est information. Our analysis of systematic risk indicates that bank
etas were affected by the publication of the outcomes of all stress
ests. Moreover, we find some evidence that the decline in betas is
n part driven by the correlation of the banks’ stocks with the mar-
et. We interpret these findings as a decrease in “systemic risk”. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a sum-
ary of related literature and outlines how our research is re-
ated to this literature. Section 3 gives an overview of the stress
ests conducted in the U.S. Section 4 outlines our methodology and
ection 5 presents our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
. Related studies and contribution 
Our study is related to three strands of literature. First, several
tudies examine whether bank opacity differs from that of non-
nancial firms in ‘normal’ times (cf. Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al.,
0 04; Iannotta, 20 06; Jones et al., 2012; Haggard and Howe, 2012 ).
 good example is the paper by Flannery et al. (2013) who study
ank equity’s trading characteristics and find only limited evidence
hat banks are unusually opaque during normal times. From this
erspective, several studies examine the information value of U.S.
tress tests. Morgan et al. (2014) conclude that market participants
orrectly identified which institutions had sufficient capital under
he 2009 SCAP stress test, but were surprised by how much cap-
tal was required for under-capitalized banks. These authors also
nd that under-capitalized banks experienced more negative ab-
ormal returns. Flannery et al. (2017) examine the average ab-
olute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with U.S.
tress test result announcements. In addition, these authors exam-
ne whether trading volume deviates from what would be expected
iven market-wide trading volume. They find that disclosure of su-
ervisory stress test results generates significant, new information
bout stress tested BHCs. The reported CARs are sometimes pos-
tive and sometimes negative, while average absolute value CARs
re significantly larger than pre-disclosure event values around
ost disclosure dates for stress tested BHCs. These authors also
nd that average abnormal trading volumes are significantly higher
n the typical stress test disclosure date. Finally, their results sug-
est that stress tests produce more information about riskier or
ore highly leveraged BHCs. Also Fernandes et al., 2017 conclude
hat there appears to be new information in U.S. stress tests, es-
ecially when markets are under distress. Ahnert et al. (2018) find
hat banks that passed the test experience positive abnormal eq-
ity returns and tighter CDS spreads, while banks that failed show
trong drops in equity prices and widening CDS spreads. The au-
hors also document strong market reactions at the announcement
ate of the stress tests. 
Stress tests have also been conducted by European supervisors
nd several papers examine whether the disclosure of the out-
omes affected financial markets. Petrella and Resti (2013) find sig-
ificant but modest market responses to the European Banking Au-
hority (EBA) stress test in 2011 and conclude that the stress test
roduced valuable information for the market as investors were
ot able to anticipate its results. Ellahie (2012) studies equity and
redit market data of Eurozone banks that took part in the EBA
tress tests in 2010 and 2011. His findings indicate that equity andid-ask spreads were not significantly affected by stress test an-
ouncements but declined after the disclosure of stress test re-
ults. Beltratti (2011) argues that the 2011 EBA stress test pro-
uced new information, as investors could not a priori distinguish
etween capitalized and under-capitalized banks. Carboni et al.,
017 examine the market reaction to every single step of the ECB’s
omprehensive Assessment (CA) run in preparation of the Single
upervisory Mechanism (SSM), i.e. the European Banking Union.
hey find that the CA exercise was able to produce new valu-
ble information. These authors also report a negative treatment
ffect for banks subject to direct ECB supervision, which were pe-
alized both at the disclosure of CA results and at the official
aunch of the SSM. Earlier research by Sahin and de Haan, 2016 ,
hich is also based on an event study methodology, found that
anks’ stock market prices and CDS spreads generally showed no
eaction in response to the publication of the CA outcomes, al-
hough for some banks the assessment led to increased trans-
arency, as markets responded to the provision of new informa-
ion. Lazzari et al. (2017) , who measure the novel informational
ontent of the CA by quantifying the portion of the cross-section
ariation of its findings explained by available public information,
eport that even though the CA did not add much to the publicly
vailable information set, abnormal returns were negative across
lmost all banks in response to the disclosure of the CA findings.
ccording to these authors, this reflects that investors rather than
earning how sound each bank was, became aware that the new
upervisory regime would be harsher and priced bank stocks ac-
ordingly. Georgescu et al. (2017) also use an event study approach
o analyze how market participants reacted to the 2014 Compre-
ensive Assessment and the 2016 EBA EU-wide stress test. These
uthors conclude that stress test disclosures revealed new infor-
ation that was priced by the markets. They also provide evidence
hat the impact on bank CDS spreads and equity prices tended to
e stronger for the weaker performing banks in the stress test. 3 
Table A.11 in the Appendix provides a summary of recent em-
irical papers on the market response to stress tests. In line with
ome previous papers on European stress tests, in our analysis of
.S. stress tests we distinguish between several test related events,
uch as the announcement of the stress test and the disclosure of
he methodology and the stress test outcomes. We also distinguish
etween banks with and banks without capital shortfalls. 
The literature on supervisory transparency and disclosure is
lso closely related to our work. The central question addressed
n this line of research is to what extent supervisory information
hould be disclosed. According to Goldstein and Sapra, 2014 , in
ertain environments more disclosure is not necessarily better if
ne considers economic efficiency. 4 Accordingly, the costs associ-
ted with disclosure of stress test results can be minimized in par-
icular by disclosing aggregate, rather than bank-specific results.
lso Schuermann (2014) argues that the degree of optimal dis-
losure may depend on the environment. During times of crisis,
he need for bank-specific disclosure is greater while during nor-
al times the cost-benefit analysis of the disclosure of stress test
nformation may lean towards more aggregated information. Like-
















































































































5 Macro-prudential stress testing has evolved over time. This type of stress tests 
is discussed by Galati and Moessner (2013) . Criticism raised has led to the develop- 
ment of new stress testing models; see, for instance, Foglia (2009) , Chan-Lau (2013) , 
Breuer et al. (2009) , and Huang et al. (2012) . 
6 See Baudino et al., 2018 for a comparative analysis of system-wide stress tests 
in the euro area, the U.S. Japan, and Switzerland and Quarles (2018) for propos- 
als concerning the future design of stress tests. As Baudino et al., 2018 point out, 
the design and optimal degree of disclosure (and, therefore, potentially also the im- 
pact of) stress tests depends on several considerations, notably whether the stress 
test is done under crisis or normal circumstances. During times of crisis, when 
there is uncertainty about the health of the banking system as well as individual 
banks, the publication of detailed bank-specific stress test outcomes may be use- 
ful in view of the markets’ inability to distinguish between a good bank and a bad 
( Schuermann, 2014 ). wise, Goldstein and Leitner (2018) find that during normal times,
no disclosure is optimal while during bad times some disclosure
is necessary, as it may be able to produce a stabilizing effect.
Goncharenko et al., 2018 conclude that the information disclosure
may result in a reduction of risk-adjusted expected profits for a
non-negligible fraction of banks in the system. In their model, sys-
temically important banks gain the least from the disclosure and
bear the highest cost in terms of its volatility. Moreover, their like-
lihood of experiencing a negative disclosure effect (as a result of
new information) is higher. Gick and Pausch, 2012 argue that a su-
pervisory authority can create value by disclosing the stress test
methodology together with the stress test results. 
Our work is related to this line of literature, as we do not only
examine the effects of the publication of the stress test results, but
also the effects of the announcement of the stress test ( Carboni
et al., 2017; Petrella and Resti, 2013 ) and the disclosure of the
methodology ( Carboni et al., 2017; Gick and Pausch, 2012 ). 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the impact of
regulation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).
Stress tests are used to set capital ratios, limit capital distribu-
tions, and set-up resolution regimes in case of financial distress
( BCBS, 2012 ). Bongini and Nieri, 2013 investigate the response of
financial markets to the Financial Stability Board’s publication of
the list of institutions that are too-big-to-fail. They quantify the
value of an implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy and find that financial
markets did not strongly react to the proposed new regulation re-
garding SIFIs. Schaefer et al., 2013 investigate the reaction of the
stock returns and CDS spreads of U.S. and European banks to sev-
eral regulatory reforms including the too-big-to-fail regulation in
Switzerland. These authors report significant market reactions in
response to this regulation, which strongly increased CDS spreads
of systemic banks, but affected equity prices only mildly. 
Our study is related to this literature as we examine whether
the reaction of SIFIs’ stock prices and CDS spreads to the publica-
tion of stress test information is different from that of non-SIFIs.
Furthermore, we analyze the systematic risk of banks. We expect
the beta of a bank to decline following the publication of the re-
sults of a stress test. The information provided by the stress tests
could reduce the uncertainty on bank stability and therefore would
lower the overall level of risk in the industry. This would lead to a
decline in bank betas. To study the underlying shifts in systematic
risk we decompose the changes in betas into changes in the cor-
relation of stocks with the market (“systemic risk”) and changes
in the relative variance (idiosyncratic risk) following a similar ap-
proach as Nijskens and Wagner (2011) . These authors study credit
risk transfers of banks through issuance of CDS and CLO contracts.
They disentangle the changes in betas and find that the increase in
betas was primarily due to an increase in the correlation of stocks
with the market. Although banks became individually less risky us-
ing credit risk transfers, “systemic risk” increased. As we examine
the changes in betas in a similar way we can analyze how stress
tests have affected “systemic risk”. 
3. Stress tests in the U.S. 
The Federal Reserve’s CCAR exercises conducted in 2011–15 can
be classified as micro-prudential supervisory stress tests. They are
‘top down’ in the sense that the Fed independently produced loss
estimates using its own supervisory models. Although the Fed pub-
lishes the results of stress tests, the specification of the models
used to arrive at them remains a ‘black box’ ( Bernanke, 2013 ).
An important reason for this is to prevent the homogenization of
stress test models, as banks would over time have fewer incentives
to maintain independent risk management systems and adopt the
specifications used by the Fed. These tests were conducted in the
aftermath of the crisis and unlike the SCAP in 2009 were not cri-is management stress tests. The latter differ in their emphasis on
olvency, current risks, and their specific ‘constrained bottom-up’
pproach ( Oura and Schumacher, 2012 ). For the SCAP exercise the
ed relied more on the banks’ own estimates. 
Although stress tests have been criticized because of insuffi-
ient coverage or their implementation strategy, they have be-
ome an important instrument in supervisory authorities’ toolkit.
his is true for micro-prudential ( BCBS, 2012 ) as well as macro-
rudential stress tests ( Borio et al., 2013 ). 5 Table 1 provides a de-
criptive overview of the stress tests conducted in the U.S. over
009–2015 on which we focus. Stress test design evolved. 6 In sub-
equent stress tests, the Fed refined the hypothetical scenarios tak-
ng into account the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and se-
ere adverse developments on housing, equity, and asset markets
 Federal Reserve, 2012; 2013a; 2013b ). A capital plan rule, intro-
uced in CCAR 2012, required banks to submit a description of in-
ernal processes for assessing capital adequacy. This rule includes
oth a minimum capital requirement and a buffer, which serves
s an early warning to regulators, and allows regulators to limit
anks’ capital distribution plans if a bank approaches its minimum
equirements. Although the Fed eliminated the qualitative objec-
ion as part of CCAR 2017 for large and non-complex firms the
apital planning evaluation remains part of the normal supervisory
rocess for these banks. 
As pointed out by Ng et al. (2016) , media coverage is key in un-
erstanding market reactions. Therefore, we checked whether me-
ia reported about stress tests outcomes for individual banks. As
hown in Table A.12 in the Appendix, there was substantial media
overage. Ng et al. (2016) also show that positive versus negative
edia coverage plays an important role in explaining market reac-
ions. That is why we distinguish between banks that passed the
tress test and those that did not. Our news analysis suggests that
he SCAP received considerable more attention than the subse-
uent CCAR and DFAST assessments. The news analysis also reveals
hat stress tests were a substantial part of market sentiment in
009–2015. About 10 percent of all news about the U.S. banking in-
ustry in this period is related to stress tests. Not surprisingly, the
ighest frequency of news reports on this topic appeared when the
tress test outcomes were disclosed. Other peaks occurred when
he details of the stress tests were announced and when the re-
ults for participating banks were released. As Table A.12 shows,
edia like Reuters and Bloomberg extensively reported the results
or the individual bank stress test outcomes but these reports did
ot contain other bank-specific announcements so that we can be
onfident that we identify market reactions to stress test events
nd not their reaction to other news. 
We also check whether banks in our sample have received gov-
rnment aid or capital injections during our event windows. To en-
ure that announcements of such aid are not confounding stress
ests announcements, we checked whether the banks in our sam-
le received government support under three government pro-
rams ( Bassett et al., 2016 ). First, the Capital Purchase Program
C. Sahin, J. de Haan and E. Neretina / Journal of Banking and Finance 117 (2020) 105843 5 
Table 1 
Description of U.S. stress tests. Notes: This table provides an overview of all stress tests conducted in the U.S. ( Federal Reserve, 20 09a; 20 09b; 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 
2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b ). 
Purpose/Requirements Results 
SCAP 2009 Restoring confidence, identifying future conditions for banks with 
insufficient capital. Banks are well-capitalized with Tier 1 capital 
above 6% of RWA and solvent with 4% Tier 1 common equity 
ratio. A total of 19 banks is assessed. 
Ten banks with a capital gap. Tier 1 common capital increased to 
$759 bln and Tier 1 common equity ratio increased to 10.4%. 
CCAR 2011 Quantitative assessment of capital levels and qualitative 
assessment of internal capital planning processes of banks. Banks 
submit capital plans to the Fed, largest 6 banks submit trading 
P&L statements. 
Banks mostly had to lower their capital distributions, payout 
decreased to 15% in 2011 from 38% in 2006. 
CCAR 2012 Banks that did not participate earlier are now subject to a Capital 
Plan Rule. Banks submit a description of internal processes for 
assessing capital adequacy; policies governing capital actions; 
planned capital actions; and results of company-run stress tests. 
Banks are solvent with a 5% Tier 1 common ratio. 
Four banks had a capital gap. Doubling of weighted Tier 1 
common equity ratio. 
DFAST 2013 Quantitatively assess how bank capital levels would fare in 
adverse economic conditions. Financial companies with total 
consolidated assets between $10 bln and $50 bln are required to 
conduct their own stress tests. 
One bank failed to adhere to the minimum of 5% Tier 1 common 
equity ratio. 
CCAR 2013 Quantitative and qualitative evaluation of whether a bank’s 
capital accretion and distribution decisions are prudent. Banks 
have to disclose their own estimates of stressed losses and 
revenues. The Fed also discloses whether or not it objected to 
each bank’s capital plan. 
Two banks conditionally approved, two banks not approved. 
DFAST 2014 Assessment of additional banks with $50 bln or more total 
consolidated assets. The Fed independently projects balance 
sheets and RWAs of each bank. The Basel III revised regulatory 
capital framework is incorporated into the assessment. A total of 
30 banks is assessed. 
Over the nine quarters of the planning horizon, losses at the 30 
banks under the severely adverse scenario are projected to be 
$501 bln. One bank did not pass the assessment. 
CCAR 2014 Banks with significant trading activities are required to apply a 
hypothetical Global Market Shock to trading and counter-party 
exposures. Banks are subject to a new counter-party default 
scenario requirement and must include losses from the default of 
their largest stressed counter-party. A bank’s projected capital 
ratios are interpreted relative to the minimum capital 
requirements in effect for each quarter of the planning horizon. 
Five banks did not pass the test. 
DFAST 2015 A total of 31 banks is assessed. All banks passed the test. 
CCAR 2015 Banks were required to reflect the transition arrangements and 
minimum capital requirements of the revised regulatory capital 
framework in their estimates of pro forma capital levels and 
capital ratios. 

































8 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
9 We include GMAC (Ally Financial) in our CDS analysis but exclude it from our 
stock analysis as it was not publicly traded. We also exclude MUFG Americas Hold- CPP) was part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under
he CPP, the U.S. Treasury provided capital ($204.9 billion) to cer-
ain financial institutions in exchange for preferred stock or debt
ecurities, beginning on 28 October, 2008. The final disbursement
rom the CPP facility originated on 29 December, 2009. Another
ARP program, the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), was estab-
ished in December 2008 to stabilize two firms considered system-
cally important: Citigroup and Bank of America. Each firm received
20 billion in exchange for preferred stock. Finally, the Community
evelopment Capital Initiative (CDCI) started in February 2010 and
as also a component of TARP. This program was much smaller in
ize ($570 million disbursed) than the CPP or TIP and it provided
apital specifically to Community Development Financial Institu-
ions (CDFIs), such as small banks, thrifts, and credit unions. We
onsulted the U.S. Treasury website whether stress-tested banks
eceived support under CPP or TIP and if so, whether the disburse-
ents coincided with the event windows used in our analysis. 7 It
urns out that none of our event windows coincide with dates on








herefore announcements of government aid are not confounding
ur stress test results. 8 
. Data and methodology 
.1. Data 
We use equity returns of banks that have participated in the
.S. stress tests over the 2009–2015 period. We employ the S&P
00 returns index as proxy for the market portfolio. Data were ob-
ained from Bloomberg. Table 2 lists the participating banks con-
idered in our research and shows the results of the stress tests. 9 
e also use daily data on 5-year senior CDS spreads for a subset of
he banks. 10 We employ the CDX Investment Grade Index provided
y Bloomberg as proxy for a market portfolio in the CDS market.ngs Corporation and Citizens Financial Group. The banks included in the stress tests 
over at least 66% of total US banking sector assets. 
10 The sample for our CDS analysis is smaller as credit default swaps of some 
anks were not available or not traded. The following banks are included in our 
DS analysis: American Express, Bank of America, Capital One Financial, Citigroup, 
MAC (Ally Financial), Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Metlife, Morgan Stanley, 
nd Wells Fargo. 
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Table 2 
List of the banks which passed/failed the stress tests. Notes: This table presents the list of the banks which passed/failed the 2009–2015 stress tests. ‘+’ means that a 
bank passed the stress test without any frictions (‘No-Gap’ banks), and ‘-’ indicates that a bank did not meet the minimum post-stress capital ratio requirements or had 
deficiencies in its capital planning process that undermine its overall reliability of capital planning process (‘Gap’ banks). An empty cell denotes that the bank did not 
participate in the corresponding testing procedure. The banks are divided into global SIFIs, domestic SIFIs, and non-SIFIs according to the classification of the Financial 
Stability Board ( FSB, 2014 ). 
Banks 2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Global SIFIs SCAP CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR 
Bank of America - + + + + + + + 
BNY Mellon + + + + + + + + 
Citigroup - - + + + - + + 
Deutsche Bank + - 
Goldman Sachs + + + - + + + + 
HSBC + - + + 
JPMorgan Chase + + + - + + + + 
Morgan Stanley - + + + + + + + 
Santander + - + - 
State Street + + + + + + + + 
Wells Fargo - + + + + + + + 
Domestic SIFIs 
Ally Financial - - - - + + + + 
American Express + + + - + + + + 
BB&T + + + - + + + + 
Capital One + + + + + + + + 
Fifth Third Bank - + + + + + + + 
PNC - + + + + + + + 
Regions Financial - + + + + + + + 
SunTrust Banks - - + + + + + + 
U.S. Bancorp + + + + + + + + 
Non-SIFIs 
BBVA Compass + + + + 
BMO + + + + 
Comerica + + + + 
Discover + + + + 
Huntington + + + + 
KeyCorp - + + + + + + + 
MetLife + - 
M&T + + + + 
Northern Trust + + + + 










































11 We have considered different event windows: ( −2,0), (0,+2), ( −2,+2), ( −3,0), 
(0,+3), ( −3,+3), ( −10,0), (0,+10), ( −10,+3) and ( −3,+10). These findings (not pre- 
sented) are in line with our main results. 
12 We have checked our results using longer estimation windows as well (accept- 
ing an overlap with events related to stress tests in other years). These findings (not 
presented) are in line with our main results. This index represents the rolling equally-weighted average of 125
of the most liquid North American CDS series with relevant rating
of at least “BBB-” or “Baa3” and with 5 years maturity. In all anal-
yses we exclude official holidays and days with limited trading. 
Our measures for systematic and “systemic risk” are derived
using market data. Alternative systemic risk measures used in
the literature consider bank balance sheet data or a combination
of balance sheet and market data. Some widely used examples
are the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) ( Adrian and Brunner-
meier, 2016 ), SRISK ( Acharya et al., 2017; Brownlees and Engle,
2017 ), and the Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) ( Huang et al.,
2012 ). These measures allow to identify systemic risk at the in-
dividual bank level taking into account the size of a bank and its
stock of accumulated debt (among other things). In contrast, our
approach focuses on the volatility of stocks in relation to the over-
all market. Beta measures the exposure a particular stock, or a sec-
tor, has in relation to the market. This makes our decomposition
exercise, explained in the next section, a particularly useful ap-
proach in assessing how stress tests have affected “systemic risk”
of the banking sector. 
4.2. Methodology 
To examine whether stress tests have affected equity or CDS
markets we follow most of the literature and use an event
study methodology described e.g. in Brown and Warner (1985) ,
Thompson (1995) , or MacKinlay (1997) . Fig. 1 provides an
overview of all the relevant stress test events. We present find-ngs for a 3-days event window (-1,+1). As pointed out by
lannery et al. (2017) , such a short event window ensures that we
apture the impact of stress testing public disclosures, although
t the risk of understating the impact of stress testing if infor-
ation arrives in the market outside this window. 11 Our estima-
ion window for equity returns and CDS spreads consists of 255
rading days, i.e. the (-265,-10) time interval, where t = 0 is the
vent date of the corresponding stress test. We use shorter win-
ows (up to 155 trading days) when necessary to avoid overlaps
ith events related to stress tests in other years. All our event win-
ows are sufficiently long to conduct an event study using daily
ata ( MacKinlay, 1997 ). 12 When event windows are overlapping,
r a single event affects multiple banks, we can no longer assume
hat the abnormal returns of securities are cross-sectionally uncor-
elated. Fig. 1 shows that the date of the methodology release and
he date of the disclosure of the results of the CCAR in 2012 are
articularly close. In this case, the covariance may deviate from
ero and we can no longer use the distributional results for the
ggregated abnormal returns ( MacKinlay, 1997 ). Consequently, we
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reat the disclosure of the methodology and the results of CCAR
012 as a “large” event. 13 
To measure the impact of an event we set the abnormal return
f a security as the difference between the actual (ex post) return
nd the normal return over the relevant event window. Normal re-
urns are estimated using the following market model, 
 i,t = αi + βi R m,t + ε i,t (1)
here R i,t is the daily return of equity of bank i at time t , and R m,t 
s the return of a market portfolio (the S&P 500 returns index).
imilarly the CDS spread of bank i at time t is regressed on the
pread of the overall index, the CDX Investment Grade Index (cf.
orden and Weber, 2004; Morgan et al., 2014 ). The residuals or
bnormal returns (AR) implied by the market model are given by,
R i,t = R i,t −
(
ˆ αi + ˆ βi R m,t 
)
(2) 
here the circumflex indicates that the parameter concerned is es-
imated. The abnormal returns are summed over the relevant win-
ow around the event date to compute the cumulative abnormal
eturn (CAR). 14 In our base line model, we cumulate abnormal re-
urns for the 3-day window (-1,+1). The t-statistics are adjusted
or event clustering and event induced volatility following Kolari
nd Pynnonen, 2010a . 15 The adjusted t-statistics are employed to
est whether the CAR is significantly different from zero. In addi-
ion, we use the non-parametric generalized rank test described in
olari and Pynnonen, 2010b which is insensitive to distortions in
he returns distribution and to the existence of significant correla-
ion between time series. 
In order to assess the possible changes in systematic risk caused
y stress test events we decompose the beta into a market correla-
ion component and a volatility component following Nijskens and
agner (2011) . We estimate the relation between returns and a
ank’s beta using the following model, 
 i,t = αi + βi R m,t + 
∑ 
δ j D 
j + 
∑ 
β j D 
j ∗ R m,t + ε i,t (3)13 In this respect our approach is similar to that of Morgan et al. (2014) who 
onsider the clarification event of the SCAP in 2009, which actually consist of two 
vents: Bernanke’s testimony on 24 March 2009 and the release of further details 
bout the stress test on 23 and 25 March 2009. They disentangle the effects of the 
vents by considering how equity and bond-holders are affected. They reason that 
he former event mattered for both market participants but the release of the Cap- 
tal Assistance Plan details mattered only for equity holders. 
14 With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the cumulative abnormal spreads 
btained from the CDS counterpart of (1) also as CARs. 
15 In the presence of event clustering, cross-correlation among securities may lead 
o over rejection of the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns. Not all 
vent studies on stress tests adjust for clustering (e.g. Candelon and Sy, 2015 ), but 
n our view it is the proper procedure. See also Amici et al. (2013) ; Fratianni and 









here αi is the bank fixed effect, D 
j is a dummy variable with
alue of 1 after the event and up to ten trading days of the follow-
ng stress test event j with j ∈ { A, M, R } denote the announcement,
ethodology, and the publication of the stress test results, respec-
ively. The dummy D j is used to measure the permanent mean ef-
ect of stress tests. The interaction terms of interest are D A ∗R m,t ,
 
M ∗R m,t , and D R ∗R m,t . The coefficients β j capture respectively the
hange in bank betas after the announcement, methodology, and
esult events and measure the change in a bank’s beta in the total
eriod after an event. Our periods (i.e. trading days) for evaluating
eta therefore vary over time. 16 
Next, we decompose the changes in betas into changes in the
orrelation of stocks with the market and changes in the relative
ariance. That is, the beta can be represented by, 




here ρ i,m is the correlation between equity i and the market and
m denotes the variance of the market. 
17 The beta in (4) is the
roduct of the correlation of a bank’s equity price with the mar-
et and its standard deviation relative to that of the market. We
hen normalize our model in (3) by dividing the equity and mar-
et returns by their respective standard deviations. 18 As a conse-
uence, the coefficient of the normalized returns equals the cor-
elation of the previous series, and (4) changes to βi = ρi . The re-
ression equation is then changed to, 
˜ 
 i,t = ˜ αi + ρi ̃  R m,i,t + 
∑ 
δ j D 
j + 
∑ 
ρ j D 
j ∗ ˜ R m,i,t + ε i,t (5) 
here 
˜ R i,t = 
R i,t /σi,t<t i if t < t i 
R i,t /σi,t≥t i if t ≥ t i and 
˜ 
 m,i,t = R m,i,t /σm,t<t i if t < t i R m,i,t /σm,t≥t i if t ≥ t i 16 Note that we exclude the clarification and methodology events of 2009 in our 
eta analysis as they are very close to the announcement and result release of SCAP, 
espectively. Similarly, we only consider the announcement of DFAST and the results 
elease of CCAR as these are the first and last events of interest in 2013, respec- 
ively. 
17 To arrive at (4) , note that individual stock beta βi = cov i,m σ 2 m can be represented as 




18 To identify shifts in the relative variance, σ i / σ m , we do the following decom- 
osition: β1 = β0 + β where the superscripts denote the beta before and after 




σ 1 m 
= (ρ0 
i,m 
+ ρi,m ) σ
1 
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σ 1 m 








+ρi,m and, therefore, a change in relative variance is 
σ 1 
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Table 3 
Stock market reaction to stress tests (in %). Notes: This table presents CARs for the main stress test events over the 2009–2015 period calculated using Eq. (2) with a 
(-1,+1) event window. Reported significance is based on corrected t-statistics. Column ‘All’ shows the effects of events on the average CARs of all banks. Columns ‘No-Gap’ 
and ‘Gap’ shows the effects for banks with and without capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Column ‘% > 0’ indicates the fraction 
of the CARs of all banks that is positive. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 5%, ∗ - 10%. 
All % > 0 No-Gap % > 0 Gap % > 0 
2009 
Announcement −.4203 44.4 −.2026 44.4 −.6378 44.4 
Clarification 21.13 ∗∗ 100 10.66 ∗ 100 31.60 ∗∗ 100 
Methodology .3583 50 4.002 66.7 −3.285 33.3 
Results SCAP 14.31 77.8 11.28 77.8 17.33 77.8 
2011 
Announcement −2.348 27.8 
Methodology −1.766 ∗ 16.7 
2012 
Announcement −.2958 44.4 −.0333 53.3 −1.609 ∗∗∗ 0 
Results CCAR 2.308 88.9 2.935 ∗ 93.3 −.8292 66.7 
2013 
Announcement 2.320 ∗∗ 94.1 
Results DFAST 1.223 88.2 
Announcement 1.586 82.4 1.626 76.9 1.404 ∗∗∗ 100 
Results CCAR .6509 70.6 .9765 76.9 −.4072 50 
2014 
Announcement −.8483 25.9 −.9805 21.7 −.0883 50 
Results DFAST .6321 70.4 .7339 73.9 .6310 100 
Results CCAR −1.212 18.5 −1.389 ∗ 13 −.1971 50 
2015 
Announcement −1.363 25 −1.355 26.9 −1.464 ∗∗∗ 0 
Results DFAST 1.584 85.7 
















































19 In 2012 the methodology and results were released on two consecutive days. 
As discussed in our methodology section, we treat these events as a single ‘large’ 
event. 
20 Our finding is different from that of Morgan et al. (2014) because in as- 
sessing the average effect on CARs our methodology accounts for event cluster- 
ing ( Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010a ). Another difference is the estimation period. 
Morgan et al. (2014) estimate their analysis over a relatively less volatile period 
(July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007). Our findings are robust to a change in the estima- 
tion period. and t i stands for the event date. The coefficients ρ j with j ∈ { A, M,
R } in Eq. (5) capture respectively the share of the change in bank
betas after the announcement, methodology, and result events that
are due to the market correlation component. As these changes
signal system-wide changes, we can interpret the latter as “sys-
temic risk” ( Nijskens and Wagner, 2011 ). 
5. Results 
5.1. How do stress tests affect stock and CDS spreads? 
Tables 3 and 4 present our findings over the (-1,+1) event
window. Table 3 shows reactions in the stock market and
Table 4 shows reactions in CDS spreads. We discuss each in turn,
considering the announcement, clarification, methodology, and re-
sult events. 
5.1.1. Stock market 
As shown in Table 3 , the announcements of stress tests gener-
ally had a mixed effect on equity returns. The stock market reacted
positively to the announcement of DFAST and CCAR in 2013, but
negatively in 2012. The mixed effect on stock prices may reflect
that generally stress test announcements provide limited (quanti-
tative) information on the way the stress tests will be conducted
or how their results will be used. 
The market’s reaction to then chairman Bernanke’s clarification
in 2009 that banks would not be nationalized caused an upward
movement in equity returns. The clarification event notably in-
creased the CARs of gap banks by 31.6 percent as these banks were
at the time considered to be at risk to be nationalized. Similar to
Morgan et al. (2014) , we find no evidence that the methodology
disclosure of the SCAP has led to changes in stock prices. There is
some evidence that the publication of the methodology of CCARn 2011 has affected stock prices negatively. In the other years the
ethodology and results were released jointly. 19 
The estimates reported in Table 3 suggest that the release of
tress test results after 2009 only occasionally moved stock mar-
ets. This holds for both gap and no-gap banks’ stock prices. 20 
herefore, our estimation results for 2009 suggest that only
he clarification event mattered for the stock market. To assure
hether our assessment window is not too narrow, Table A.13 in
he Appendix provides findings over extended event windows for
he SCAP stress test. The results over longer event windows cor-
oborate our results. 
As shown in Table 3 , in some years stock markets reacted
weakly) to the release of stress test outcomes. In 2012, for exam-
le, we find for the sample of no-gap banks that the equity market
eacted positively to the disclosure of the stress test results. Note,
owever, that the magnitude of the reaction of stock markets to
he disclosure of stress test information after 2009 is lower than
hat in 2009 following chairman Bernanke’s clarification. Arguably,
uring a crisis the need for credible information is greater than
n calmer periods so the market may have valued the information
isclosed in the clarification in 2009 more ( Schuermann, 2014 ).
inally, our results suggest that the market reaction in response
o the disclosure of post-crisis stress test information may change
ign. This is particularly so for the announcement effects (negative
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Table 4 
CDS spreads reaction to stress tests (in bp). Notes: This table presents CARs for the main stress test events over the 2009–2015 period calculated using Eq. (2) with a 
(-1,+1) event window. Reported significance is based on corrected t-statistics. Column ‘All’ shows the effects of events on the average CARs of all banks. Columns ‘No-Gap’ 
and ‘Gap’ show the effects for banks with and without capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Column ‘% > 0’ indicates the fraction 
of the CARs of all banks that is positive. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 5%, ∗ - 10%. 
All % > 0 No-Gap % > 0 Gap % > 0 
2009 
Announcement −13.04 0 −10.81 0 −15.83 0 
Clarification 18.65 55.6 32.15 60 1.762 50 
Methodology −11.28 33.3 −19.72 20 −.7275 50 
Results SCAP −81.70 0 −55.43 ∗∗ 0 −114.7 0 
2011 
Announcement 3.496 60 
Methodology −11.04 ∗∗ 0 
2012 
Announcement 11.64 70 9.152 57.1 17.42 ∗∗∗ 100 
Results CCAR −10.63 0 −10.54 ∗ 0 −10.84 0 
2013 
Announcement −1.459 33.3 
Results DFAST .8788 66.7 
Announcement −8.848 11.1 −9.394 20 −8.167 0 
Results CCAR −4.877 ∗ 0 −4.429 0 −5.438 ∗ 0 
2014 
Announcement 2.369 100 2.258 100 3.251 100 
Results DFAST −.8816 33.3 
Results CCAR .9118 66.7 .4411 62.5 4.677 100 
2015 
Announcement 1.556 89.9 
Results DFAST −.1971 44.4 


























































s  n 2012 and positive in 2013) but also for the effects of the pub-
ication of the stress test results (negative in 2014 and positive in
015). 
.1.2. CDS Spreads 
As Table 4 shows, the announcement events had a mixed effect
n CDS spreads. Spreads were negatively affected in 2009 for no-
ap banks and positively in 2012 for gap banks. Moreover, in con-
rast to the stock market, Bernanke’s clarification of the stress test
n 2009 did not affect the CDS market. This response is expected
ue to the structure of the CDS agreements where any change in
wnership due to nationalization would not bring additional losses
o contract parties. 21 
For the methodology events we find mixed results. The an-
ouncement had no impact on CDS spreads in 2009. However,
n 2011 CDS spreads declined significantly following the release
f the stress test methodology. This suggests that the release of
he methodology in 2009 was less informative for the market
han the announcement in 2011. In 2011, there was no disclosure
f stress test results, which could have led the market valuing
he information provided by the methodology disclosure relatively
trongly. 
Table 4 shows a decline in the average CDS spreads in 2009 for
o-gap banks following the publication of the stress test results .
verage spreads dropped 55.43 basis points for no-gap banks. The
isclosure of the results of CCAR in 2012 and 2013 also seem to
ave led to lower CDS spreads although the evidence is statistically
eak. In contrast, the results of DFAST seem to have been unin-21 Morgan et al. (2014) find a decline in CDS spreads following the clarification 
vent (but only for gap banks). However, they consider CDS contracts with an MR 
ocument clause. This entails that these contracts do not suppose full coverage in 
ase of a credit event. As we do not consider these types of contracts a possible 




ormative to the CDS market. There are two possible reasons why
CAR in 2013 affected CDS spreads stronger than DFAST. Firstly, as
able 2 shows, in DFAST all the banks in our sample received ap-
roval while in CCAR three of these banks were not approved. The
arket may therefore have attached more importance to the re-
ults of CCAR. Alternatively, the different respons could be due to
he underlying assumptions of the stress tests. While DFAST was
onducted conditional on no change in the capital distributions,
CAR incorporated the capital plans proposed by the banks and,
herefore, may have better reflected creditworthiness ( Federal Re-
erve, 2013a ). Table A.13 in the Appendix offers our results for
xtended event windows for the SCAP stress test. The results for
onger event windows are in line with our main findings for the
redit market: spreads decline following the publication of stress
est results. 
.2. How do stress tests affect individual banks? 
Next, we turn to market reactions at the bank level. As we do
ot account for individual bank (balance sheet) characteristics in
ables 3 and 4 , banks’ stocks and CDS spreads may have been af-
ected while this is not picked up in our previous analyses. Table 5
resents stock market reactions following the disclosure of stress
est results. After the release of the SCAP results the stock price of
ome banks, regardless of the assessment outcome, increased. In
ontrast, stock prices did not respond to the CCAR in 2011 (when
he results at the individual bank level were not released). The
ublication of the stress test outcomes of subsequent tests occa-
ionally impacted the equity returns of banks, and, when this hap-
ened, it seems that only one event (either DFAST or CCAR) pro-
ided new information. 22 The magnitude of reactions to the CCAR22 The exception is the CCAR 2015 results for PNC which seems to have provided 
nformation in both the DFAST and CCAR events. 
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Table 5 
Stock market reactions to the disclosure of stress test results at bank level (in %). Notes: This table presents CARs for each bank following the publication of stress test 
results over the 2009–2015 period calculated using Eq. (2) with a (-1,+1) event window. The banks are divided into global SIFIs, domestic SIFIs, and non-SIFIs according to 
the classification of the Financial Stability Board ( FSB, 2014 ). 
Banks 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Global SIFIs SCAP CCAR CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR 
Bank of Amer. .2208 ∗∗ −.0138 .0669 .0315 .0375 .0225 −.0158 .0338 ∗ .0039 
BNY Mellon .1020 −.0007 .0173 .0142 .0017 .0171 −.0092 .0037 .0193 
Citigroup .1525 −.0355 .0016 .0565 ∗∗ −.0007 .0272 −.0457 ∗ .0086 .0290 ∗
Deutsche Bank .0181 .0076 
Goldman Sachs −.0026 .0108 .0103 −.0076 .0148 .0040 −.0132 −.0035 .0174 
HSBC −.0234 .0162 −.033 ∗∗ −.0173 
JPMorgan Ch. .0611 .0039 .0505 ∗ .0071 −.0094 .0128 −.0139 .0023 .0055 
Morgan Stanley −.0409 −.0110 −.0091 .0033 .0349 .0027 −.043 ∗∗ .0166 .0478 ∗∗∗
Santander −.0093 .0297 −.0128 −.0184 
State Street .1724 −.0211 .0446 .0219 .0105 .0071 −.0192 −.0151 .0080 
Wells Fargo .1466 ∗ −.0240 .0354 .0076 .0344 ∗∗ −.0033 .0063 .0004 .0219 ∗∗
Domestic SIFIs 
American Expr. .0328 −.0020 .0308 .0015 .0071 −.0071 −.0072 .0074 .0246 ∗∗
BB&T .0204 −.0279 .0179 .0225 −.0196 .0080 −.0072 .0261 ∗∗ .0184 
Capital One .4326 ∗∗∗ −.0212 .0293 −.0047 .0044 −.0033 .0114 .0167 .0263 ∗∗
Fifth Third .5745 ∗∗∗ −.0146 .0254 .0076 .0127 .0096 −.032 ∗∗ .0205 −.0014 
PNC .1885 ∗ −.0157 .0189 .0117 .0141 .0150 −.0169 .0328 ∗∗∗ .0288 ∗∗
Regions Fin. .1249 −.0454 .0332 .0139 .0181 .0277 −.0212 .0380 ∗∗ .0236 
SunTrust Banks .1673 −.0050 .0302 .0312 −.0259 .0106 −.0272 .0333 ∗∗ .0234 
U.S. Bancorp −.0063 −.0228 .0478 ∗ .0032 −.0104 .0108 −.022 ∗∗ .0146 −.0028 
Non-SIFIs 
BBVA Compass −.0152 −.0194 .0091 .0028 
BMO −.0143 .0139 −.0045 −.0018 
Comerica .0260 −.0331 ∗ .0476 ∗∗∗ .0046 
Discover −.0069 −.0073 .0025 .0217 ∗
Huntington .0097 −.0150 .0287 ∗ .0179 
KeyCorp −.0088 −.0497 .0359 .0244 .0172 .0138 −.0162 .0443 ∗ .0283 ∗
MetLife .1994 ∗ .0041 −.0552 ∗
M&T −.0017 −.0085 .0273 ∗∗ .0143 
Northern Trust .0205 −.0140 .0174 .0104 











































t  outcomes are also weaker than those in response to the SCAP out-
comes. Moreover, the direction of reactions is not uniform. For ex-
ample, the stock price of Citigroup, which was one of the banks
that did not pass the assessment, shows a negative reaction after
the release of the CCAR outcomes in 2014. This is likely due to
problems with its capital plan such as measurement of risks and
losses as divulged by regulators. Table A.12 in the Appendix pro-
vides an overview of the likely causes in stock markets movements
of gap-banks as evinced by news outlets and financial market par-
ticipants. 23 Surprisingly, stock prices of some banks that passed the
stress test also show a negative reaction. 
Similarly, Table 6 presents the response in the CDS market at
the individual bank level. The findings are in line with our earlier
results. That is, the release of SCAP stress test results had some im-
pact on banks’ CDS spreads whereas the publication of SCAP stress
tests results had little impact on banks’ CDS spreads. 
To check whether our results are robust to using alternative
market indices, we reestimate Tables 5 and 6 using diversified
stock and CDS indices geared specifically for banks. The series we
use are the S & P500 Banks Index and the Banking 5Y CDS Index.
Tables A.14 and A.15 in the Appendix present the findings. As both
tables show, while statistical significance is weaker, the findings
are similar to our earlier results. 24 
Overall, our findings indicate that over the years stress tests
only occasionally moved both stock and CDS markets. The market23 For example, other factors that may have caused concerns are the audit and 
anti-money-laundering procedures of banks, and a failure to correct problems 
raised earlier by the Fed. 







esponses to the SCAP was generally stronger than those follow-
ng later stress tests. Moreover, despite the fact that some global
IFIs in our sample had difficulty obtaining regulators’ approval for
heir capital distribution plans the market responses do not seem
o indicate a difference in pattern across SIFIs and non-SIFIs. 
.3. How do stress tests affect systematic and “systemic risk”? 
This section offers the results of our analysis of systematic and
systemic risk” for which we adopt a longer time horizon. As be-
ore, we contrast the findings for gap and no-gap banks. We con-
lude each subsection by reestimating our findings using an alter-
ative proxy for our diversified returns index. 
.3.1. Systematic risk and “systemic risk”
Table 7 presents the estimation results for our baseline model
3) . We focus our discussion on the interaction terms. The findings
how that the impact of the announcement of stress tests is mixed.
n 2009, the announcement of SCAP led to an increase in system-
tic risk. Given our earlier findings, a likely explanation might be
nvestors’ fear for nationalization of banks that would failed the
CAP. For the remaining years there is no consistent evidence of
ovement in betas. Considering results events, in 2009 the be-
as dropped following the publication of the results of the SCAP.
pecifically, we find a strong decline in systematic risk ( −.2305)
fter the publication of its results. Similarly, the beta of banks de-
lined after the release of stress test results in 2013 ( −.2174) and
015 ( −.2577). These findings suggest that market participants ex-
ected stress test results to be worse than they turned out to be
o that the betas declined in 2009, 2013, and 2015. 
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Table 6 
CDS spreads reactions to the disclosure of stress test results at bank level (in bp). Notes: This table presents CARs per bank following the publication of stress test results 
over the 2009–2015 period calculated using Eq. (2) with a (-1,+1) event window. The banks are divided into global SIFIs, domestic SIFIs, and non-SIFIs according to the 
classification of the Financial Stability Board ( FSB, 2014 ). 
Banks 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Global SIFIs SCAP CCAR CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR 
Bank of Amer. −102 ∗∗∗ −14.18 −21.52 3.82 −2.42 −2.62 3.98 .315 .867 
Citigroup −203 ∗∗∗ −12.28 −1.46 −2.85 −5.51 −3.00 4.22 −1.80 1.29 
Goldman Sachs −44.28 −13.91 −17.59 4.03 −3.55 −.954 −.088 −.841 1.99 
JPMorgan Ch. −39.12 ∗∗ −9.32 −7.45 1.79 −2.34 −2.78 −.697 −.080 1.14 
Morgan Stanley −64.20 −15.25 −21.29 4.66 −4.85 −2.44 −.222 −.261 1.40 
Wells Fargo −81.6 ∗∗∗ −7.27 −4.23 −.524 −2.05 .467 −2.40 −.775 −.032 
Domestic SIFIs 
Ally Financial −135.3 −19.96 −32.68 −2.78 −12.17 −6.60 −.056 4.61 2.77 
American Expr. −76.5 ∗∗ −5.25 −1.32 −.537 −3.78 .367 .383 −.384 −.061 
Capital One −54.9 ∗∗ −4.39 −2.99 −1.23 −4.24 −1.37 −.214 −1.04 −.062 
Non-SIFIs 
MetLife −50.24 −14.15 −2.77 
Table 7 
Systematic risk. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (3) over the period 2009–2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 5%, ∗ - 10%. 
2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Market β 1.792 ∗∗∗ 1.426 ∗∗∗ 1.566 ∗∗∗ 1.442 ∗∗∗ 1.196 ∗∗∗ 1.126 ∗∗∗
(.0625) (.0564) (.0441) (.0591) (.0485) (.0577) 
D A ∗R m .9535 ∗∗∗ .0493 .1309 −.1211 .0304 .0563 
(.1491) (.1420) (.1222) (.0978) (.0817) (.0861) 
D M ∗R m .1269 ∗
(.0723) 
D R ∗R m −.2305 ∗ −.1105 −.2174 ∗∗ −.0562 −.2577 ∗∗∗
(.1267) (.1108) (.0873) (.0867) (.0944) 
Number of id 18 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 406 334 445 367 363 
R 2 .4720 .6260 .6438 .4881 .4456 .4155 
Table 8 
Systemic risk. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (5) over the period 2009–2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ − 1%, ∗∗ − 5%, ∗ − 10%. 
2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Market ρ .7409 ∗∗∗ .7616 ∗∗∗ .8589 ∗∗∗ .7413 ∗∗∗ .6885 ∗∗∗ .6385 ∗∗∗
(.0331) (.0291) (.0287) (.0339) (.0303) (.0315) 
D A ∗ ˜ R m .0595 −.0756 −.0897 ∗ −.0583 .0076 .0732 
(.0670) (.0518) (.0537) (.0526) (.0487) (.0522) 
D M ∗ ˜ R m .0860 ∗∗
(.0415) 
D R ∗ ˜ R m −.0706 ∗ −.1367 ∗∗∗ −.0313 −.0547 −.0141 
(.0398) (.0421) (.0455) (.0462) (.0664) 
Number of id 18 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 406 334 445 367 363 




















Table 8 presents the estimation results for our standardized
odel (5) . We again focus on the coefficients of the interaction
erms, denoted by ρ . Following Nijskens and Wagner (2011) , we in-
erpret a decline in the correlation component as a decline in “sys-
emic risk”. Except for a weak effect in 2012, there is no evidence
hat announcement events affected “systemic risk” of banks. How-
ver, the methodology release in 2011 increased ρ and contributed
o the increase in beta reported in Table 7 . For results events there
s a decrease in the correlation of the stock series with the market
n 2009 and 2012, suggesting that “systemic risk” declined. 25 25 We attribute the earlier insignificance of the beta for CCAR 2012 in Table 7 to 
he relative variance component, which may have added sufficient noise to make 





s  We reestimate Tables 7 and 8 using the alternative market in-
ex aimed towards banks in respectively Tables A.16 and A.17 in
he Appendix. Using the alternative index there is stronger evi-
ence that more recent stress tests affected systematic risk (albeit
n a smaller magnitude) negatively. The significance of the impact
f earlier stress tests, notably those in 2009 and 2013, drop al-
hough Table A.17 suggests a decline in “systemic risk” in 2012. 
.3.2. Gap versus no-gap banks 
To examine whether systematic and systemic risk of gap and
o-gap banks were affected differently, we reestimate Eqs. (3) and
5) for no-gap banks and gap banks. The resulting regressions are
hown in, respectively, Tables 9 and 10 . In what follows we fo-
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Table 9 
Systematic risk gap and no-gap banks. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (3) over the period 2009–2015. Columns ‘+’ and ‘-’ show the results for 
banks without and with capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 5%, ∗ - 10%. 
2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) 
Market β 1.774 ∗∗∗ 1.744 ∗∗∗ 1.572 ∗∗∗ 1.543 ∗∗∗ 1.415 ∗∗∗ 1.372 ∗∗∗ 1.184 ∗∗∗ 1.184 ∗∗∗ 1.098 ∗∗∗ 1.045 ∗∗∗
(.0574) (.0552) (.0430) (.0406) (.0502) (.0442) (.0459) (.0407) (.0558) (.0469) 
D A ∗R m .9726 ∗∗∗ 1.002 ∗∗∗ .1247 .1544 −.0674 −.0244 .0406 .0406 .0844 .1374 ∗
(.1470) (.1464) (.1218) (.1212) (.0918) (.0890) (.0802) (.0774) (.0849) (.0798) 
D R No−gap ∗ R m −.3160 ∗∗∗ −.1792 ∗ −.1700 ∗∗ −.0278 −.1968 ∗∗
(.0923) (.1065) (.0775) (.0845) (.0953) 
D R Gap ∗ R m −.0767 .2259 ∗ −.1682 ∗∗∗ −.1560 ∗ −.6198 ∗∗∗
(.1480) (.1288) (.0646) (.0889) (.1364) 
R 2 .4721 .4710 .6443 .6438 .4915 .4907 .4455 .4454 .4139 .4140 
Number of id 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 334 394 367 363 
Table 10 
Systemic risk gap and no-gap banks. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (5) over the period 2009–2015. Columns ‘+’ and ‘-’ show the results for banks 
without and with capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as 
follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ − 5%, ∗ − 10%. 
2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
( + ) (-) ( + ) (-) ( + ) (-) ( + ) (-) ( + ) (-) 
Market β 1.774 ∗∗∗ 1.744 ∗∗∗ 1.572 ∗∗∗ 1.543 ∗∗∗ 1.415 ∗∗∗ 1.372 ∗∗∗ 1.184 ∗∗∗ 1.184 ∗∗∗ 1.098 ∗∗∗ 1.045 ∗∗∗
(.0574) (.0552) (.0430) (.0406) (.0502) (.0442) (.0459) (.0407) (.0558) (.0469) 
D A ∗R m .9726 ∗∗∗ 1.002 ∗∗∗ .1247 .1544 −.0674 −.0244 .0406 .0406 .0844 .1374 ∗
(.1470) (.1464) (.1218) (.1212) (.0918) (.0890) (.0802) (.0774) (.0849) (.0798) 
D R No−gap ∗ R m −.3160 ∗∗∗ −.1792 ∗ −.1700 ∗∗ −.0278 −.1968 ∗∗
(.0923) (.1065) (.0775) (.0845) (.0953) 
D R Gap ∗ R m −.0767 .2259 ∗ −.1682 ∗∗∗ −.1560 ∗ −.6198 ∗∗∗
(.1480) (.1288) (.0646) (.0889) (.1364) 
R 2 .4721 .4710 .6443 .6438 .4915 .4907 .4455 .4454 .4139 .4140 
Number of id 18 18 17 28 29 





















































s  cus our discussion on the beta effects associated with the results
events. 
The first two columns in Table 9 suggest that the decrease in
the beta in 2009 (as reported in Table 7 ) was due to the effects
on no-gap banks. The results of SCAP seem to have caused a sig-
nificant decrease in betas of no-gap banks while the betas of gap
banks were not affected. This finding complements the findings
of Morgan et al. (2014) who show that market participants’ ex
ante expectations of capital shortfalls were too high. Table 9 shows
that the results of CCAR 2012 may have affected the beta of no-
gap banks negatively (-.1792) and the beta of gap banks positively
(.2259) although the evidence in both cases is statistically weak.
In 2013, there is a consistent change in the overall beta follow-
ing the results of CCAR for both gap and no-gap banks. In 2014,
only gap banks show a negative change while in 2015 both no
gap and gap banks display declines in betas, (-.1968) and (-.6198)
respectively. The variation in the magnitude of the coefficients is
likely a reflection of the information value of stress tests (which
are tied to banks’ capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital
distribution plans) but also of the composition of gap banks which
changes over the years. For example, the rather high coefficient for
gap banks in 2015 (-.6198) stems from two banks (Santander and
Deutsche Bank) where the additional transparency provided by the
stress test result may have relieved market participants. Overall,
there is strong and consistent evidence for a decline in systematic
risk following stress test results in most years. 
Table 10 suggests that the publication of the stress test results
affected “systemic risk” in 2009, 2012, and 2015. The release of
stress test results decreased the “systemic risk” component of the s  eta of gap banks, in 2009 ( −.0846) and 2015 ( −.2543), and of no
ap banks in 2012 ( −.1308). 
Finally, Tables A.18 and A.19 in the Appendix present the find-
ngs using the alternative market index. The results are similar to
ur earlier findings. 
. Conclusion 
Bank supervisors expect banks to hold sufficient capital to cover
osses under adverse economic conditions. As stress testing has be-
ome an important tool for bank supervisors to achieve that goal,
t is important to consider their effects on stock and CDS markets.
e have quantified the market reactions of U.S. stress tests per-
ormed after the start of the financial crisis by considering their ef-
ects on stock returns, CDS spreads, systematic risk, and “systemic
isk”. 
Our findings suggest that over the years stress tests have moved
oth stock and CDS markets. The market responses to the 2009
CAP stress test were generally stronger than those to the subse-
uent stress tests performed by the Fed. Our findings support the
dea that the value attached to the information provided by stress
ests depends on financial circumstances at the time. During a cri-
is, the need for credible information is likely to be greater than
uring calmer periods and, therefore, the markets may have val-
ed the information provided by the SCAP more. For some of the
ost-crisis stress tests, the sample of no-gap banks indicate that
he equity market reacted positively to the disclosure of the re-
ults of stress tests. However, the findings are statistically not very
trong. Moreover, the reactions in post-crisis stress tests are not














































lways uniform, occasionally displaying negative reactions. Overall,
tock markets react positively and CDS spreads react negatively fol-
owing stress test results. Our findings do not indicate that market
eactions were systematically different for SIFIs and non-SIFIs. 
Our analysis of banks’ betas suggests that the publication of
tress test results has affected banks’ systematic and/or “systemic
isk” in nearly all years. We find evidence for a decline of sys- 
ematic risk in 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2015, while we find mixed
vidence for 2012. In 2011, when the stress test results were not
ublished, systematic (and “systemic risk”) seem to have increased.
Systemic risk” declined in 2009, 2012, and 2015 following the re-
ease of the stress tests results. Overall, our findings consistently
how that stress tests conducted during 2009–15 have been a use-
ul tool in mitigating systematic and/or systemic risks. Stress tests
herefore have produced valuable information for market partici-
ants and can play a role in mitigating bank opacity. 
These findings are also relevant for discussions about the fu-
ure design of stress tests. According to Quarles (2018) , several as-
ects of stress tests warrant further evolution. While some of these
roposals aim to improve the efficiency of stress tests, others are
eared towards increasing their transparency. More transparency
n the inputs and outputs of stress tests may improve their cred-
bility. Our findings support this recommendation only to someTable A1 
Related studies. 
Study Stress test Findings 
Morgan et al. (2014) SCAP 2009 Stress tests produce sig
experienced more nega
banks, decline followin
Flannery et al. (2017) U.S. stress tests Stress test disclosures 
well as higher abnorm
be more affected by th
Fernandes et al., 2017 U.S. stress tests Markets tend to react 
weaker as stress tests 
appears to be still som
next. 
Ahnert et al. (2018) U.S. and E.A. stress 
tests 
Banks that passed the 
while banks that failed
authors also document
Ellahie (2012) EBA 2010, 2011 The 2011 stress test re
increased information 
CDS spreads) of banks.
Alves et al., 2013 EBA 2010, 2011 Both European stress t
the volatility in stock p
stress test results. 
Petrella and Resti (2013) EBA 2011 Stress tests significantl
opaqueness. 
Sahin and de Haan, 2016 ECB’s CA Publication of the Com
stock prices and CDS s
Carboni et al., 2017 ECB’s CA Publication of informat
Lazzari et al. (2017) ECB’s CA Publication of CA resul
became aware of new 
Georgescu et al. (2017) ECB’s CA, EBA 2016 Stress test disclosures 
bank CDS spreads and 
the stress test. 
Philippon et al. (2017) E.A. stress tests Stress test model-base
returns around announ
the construction of the
ownership structures. xtent. One reason why the SCAP had more impact on stock and
DS markets than subsequent stress tests may be that in SCAP the
ed more heavily relied on banks’ own estimates thereby increas-
ng the credibility of the stress test. An important argument against
ully opening the ‘black box’ of stress testing is that it runs the risk
hat the banks will be gaming the assessment ( Bernanke, 2013 ). 
Like most previous studies in this line of research, our main
nalysis is based on an event study approach. This implies that
ur study suffers from the drawbacks of this approach. Most im-
ortantly, only unanticipated effects will lead to a change in mar-
et prices. So, the fact we do often not find significant market re-
ponses to the disclosure of stress test information does not imply
hat these stress tests are not useful (see Kohn and Liang, 2019 ,
or an evaluation of U.S. stress tests). Furthermore, event studies
an only identify effects in the short run (i.e. over the event win-
ow). An interesting avenue for future research could be to analyze
he longer-term effects of stress testing, notably on the risk-taking
ehavior of financial institutions. Another suggestion for future re-
earch is to analyze the impact of stress tests on systemic risk, us-
ng the many indicators of systemic risk that have been suggested
n the literature. 
ppendix A nificant market reaction of stock prices. Under-capitalized banks have 
tive abnormal returns. CDS spreads, particularly for under-capitalized 
g the release of stress test results. 
are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as 
al trading volume. More levered and riskier holding companies seem to 
e stress test information. 
positively to stress test announcements and, while the reaction gets 
become more established and the announcement dates known, there 
e information contained in the scenarios released from one year to the 
test experience positive abnormal equity returns and tighter CDS spreads, 
 show strong drops in equity prices and widening CDS spreads. The 
 strong market reactions at the announcement date of the stress tests. 
duced information asymmetry (i.e. equity-credit bid-ask spreads) and 
uncertainty (measured by equity option implied volatilities and ratio of 
 
ests have affected the stock prices of banks. The 2010 stress test reduced 
rices while the volatility increased following the release of the 2011 
y affect the market and are a credible evaluation tool that reduce bank 
prehensive Assessment (CA) outcomes had generally no effects on bank 
preads. 
ion in each step of CA exercise produced new valuable information. 
ts had negative effect on abnormal returns reflecting that investors 
supervisor’s policies. 
revealed new information that was priced by the markets. The impact on 
equity prices tended to be stronger for the weaker performing banks in 
d losses are good predictors of realized losses and of banks’ equity 
cements of macroeconomic news. Furthermore, no biases are detected in 



























































The causes in the movements of market reactions. This table summarizes the causes of market reactions as evinced by news outlets and financial market participants for stress tested banks. The news may 
have affected the market participants’ expectations and may shed light on the causes in the movements of market reactions for gap-banks. The news articles are extracted from a variety of news sources from 
the Dow Jones Factiva database over the 2009–2015 period for (-1,+7) days around the disclosure of the results. For stress tests conducted between 2013–2015, the window starts -1 day before the disclosure 
of the DFAST results and ends at +7 days after the disclosure of CCAR results. We searched for all news containing the words “stress test” related to the banking stress tests procedure. Our final list of articles 
contains news on individual banks, the banking industry, and the U.S. economy. The news was filtered with all the relevant bank names and with the names of related government agencies, such as the 
Federal Reserve, FDIC and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. We verified all news manually for relevance. News sources include the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Reuters, 
and Bloomberg. 
2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Ally Financial $11.5 bln capital shortfall; Losses from 
mortgages and auto loans; Lending to 
distressed General Motors and Chrysler. 
4.4% Tier 1 capital in 
the stress case; Does 
not fare well in the 
stress case; Exposure 
to mortgages. 
1.5% Tier 1 capital in the 
stress case; Exposure to 
mortgages. 
American Express Required to make only 
small adjustments in the 
capital plan. 
Bank of America $33.9 bln capital shortfall; The anticipated 
losses and increased exposure in the 
subprime market from the Merrill and 
Countrywide Financial deals; “Steep losses”. 
BB & T Problems with the data for 
the bank’s assets. 
Citigroup $5 bln capital shortfall; Company’s financial 
conditions. 
4.9% Tier 1 capital in 
the stress case; Still 
holding the toxic 
assets, not lending yet; 
Capital distribution 
plans too generous. 
Problems with the capital plan 
such as measurement of risks 
and losses; Concerns about 
the audit and 
anti-money-laundering 
procedures; Failed to correct 
the problems pointed out by 
the Fed earlier. 
Deutsche Bank Problems with projections 
in the capital plan, and 
internal controls. 
Fifth Third Bank $1.1 bln capital shortfall; Exposure to 
commercial real-estate. 
Goldman Sachs More stringent risk 
weightings on capital 
markets assets due to 
large trading operations; 
Problems with the capital 
plan (i.e. measurement of 
revenues and losses in the 
stress case). 


























































Table A2 ( continued ) 
HSBC Problems with projections in 
the capital plan, weak 
governance, and internal 
controls. 
J.P. Morgan Problems with the capital 
plan, (i.e. understating 
risks caused, deficiencies 
in internal control); Large 
trading operations. 
KeyCorp $1.8 bln capital shortfall; Exposure to 
commercial real-estate. 
MetLife 5.1% Tier 1 in the 
stress case; Business 
model different from 
banking. 




PNC $0.6 bln capital shortfall. 
Regions Financial $2.5 bln capital shortfall; Exposure to 
commercial real-estate. 
Santander Problems with projections in 
the capital plan, weak 
governance, and internal 
controls. 
Problems with projections 
in the capital plan, weak 
governance, and internal 
controls. 
SunTrust Banks $2.2 bln capital shortfall. 4.8% Tier 1 in the 
stress case. 
Wells Fargo $13.7 bln capital shortfall; Risky loans and 
securities from the acquisition of Wachovia - 
written off almost $40 bln of Wachovia’s 
troubled loans. 
Zions Bancorp Fell short of capital – 3.5% Tier 
1 ratio in the stress case. 
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Table A3 
Market reactions to the 2009 SCAP stress test over extended windows. Notes: This table presents CARs 
for the 2009 SCAP stress test calculated using Eq. (1) over extended event windows. The final rows of 
the announcement and methodology sections in the table do not extend to +10 trading days due the 
occurrence of respectively the clarification and results events. Column ‘All’ shows the effects of events 
on the average CARs of all banks. Columns ‘No-Gap’ and ‘Gap’ separate the effects into banks with and 
without capital shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans. Reported significance is based 
on corrected t-statistics. Statistical significance is denoted ∗∗∗ − 1% ∗∗ − 5%, ∗ − 10%. 
Event window All No-Gap Gap All No-Gap Gap 
Stock market (in %) Credit market (in bp) 
Announcement 
(0) −8.602 −4.016 ∗ −13.19 −4.615 −5.069 −4.049 
(-1, + 1) −.4203 −.2027 −.6378 −13.04 −10.81 −15.83 
(-1,0) −5.682 −3.327 ∗ −8.038 −16.15 ∗ −15.06 ∗∗ −17.52 
(0, + 1) −3.340 −.8917 −5.788 −1.507 −.8228 −2.363 
(-2, + 2) 4.709 −1.650 11.07 −26.87 ∗∗ −21.41 ∗∗∗ −33.69 ∗
(-2,0) 2.728 −1.117 6.627 −26.40 ∗∗ −21.16 ∗∗∗ −32.96 ∗
(0, + 2) −6.621 −4.495 −8.747 −5.082 −5.319 −4.785 
(-3, + 3) 2.050 −4.256 8.357 −28.76 ∗ −30.89 ∗∗∗ −26.10 
(-3,0) 3.303 −.9386 7.544 −32.05 ∗∗ −31.34 ∗∗∗ −32.93 
(0, + 3) −9.854 −7.333 −12.38 −1.325 −4.617 2.790 
(-10, + 3) −1.726 1.386 4.838 −45.37 ∗ −53.99 ∗∗∗ −34.60 
(-10,0) −.4734 4.703 −5.650 −48.66 ∗∗ −54.44 ∗∗∗ −41.44 
Clarification 
(0) 8.750 ∗∗∗ .7.335 ∗∗∗ 10.17 ∗∗∗ 10.51 15.42 4.372 
(-1, + 1) 21.13 ∗∗ 10.66 ∗ 31.60 ∗∗ 18.65 32.15 1.762 
(-1,0) 15.32 ∗∗∗ 9.637 ∗∗∗ 21.01 ∗∗∗ 20.44 21.15 19.54 
(0, + 1) 14.56 ∗ 8.361 ∗ 20.75 ∗∗ 8.721 26.42 −13.41 
(-2, + 2) 29.37 ∗ 19.84 ∗ 38.91 ∗ 37.51 52.81 18.39 
(-2,0) 15.87 ∗∗ 11.97 ∗∗ 19.76 ∗∗ 47.68 ∗ 40.97 ∗∗ 56.08 
(0, + 2) 22.26 ∗ 15.20 29.31 ∗ .3420 27.26 −33.31 
(-3, + 3) 14.97 12.90 17.05 48.02 72.14 17.87 
(-3,0) 9.403 8.109 10.70 64.14 ∗ 52.65 ∗ 78.50 
(0, + 3) 14.32 12.13 16.51 −5.610 34.91 −56.26 
(-3, + 10) 12.79 4.756 20.82 178.0 217.7 ∗ 128.4 ∗
(0, + 10) 12.14 3.981 20.29 124.4 180.4 54.31 
Methodology 
(0) 1.244 2.324 .1649 −9.797 −11.34 −7.862 
(-1, + 1) .3583 4.002 −3.285 −11.28 −19.72 −.7275 
(-1,0) 3.922 7.018 .8250 −2.956 −5.241 −.1009 
(0, + 1) −2.319 −.6926 −3.945 −18.12 −25.83 −8.488 
(-2, + 2) −5.445 −.3120 −10.58 1.302 −12.67 18.77 
(-2,0) .1950 4.081 −3.691 5.265 4.514 6.205 
(0, + 2) −4.396 −2.069 −6.722 −13.76 −28.53 4.699 
(-3, + 3) .8916 7.978 −6.195 19.28 .1463 43.20 
(-3,0) 4.675 9.999 −.6495 22.52 20.11 25.54 
(0, + 3) −2.539 .3024 −5.380 −13.04 −31.31 9.803 
(-10, + 3) 8.398 11.29 5.507 −62.80 −89.86 −28.96 
(-10,0) 11.72 12.94 10.49 −58.70 −69.96 −44.64 
Result 
(0) −1.213 −.4244 −2.001 −34.68 ∗ −27.47 −43.70 ∗∗
(-1, + 1) 14.31 11.28 17.33 −81.76 −55.43 ∗∗ −114.7 
(-1,0) 6.536 5.724 7.347 −64.06 −44.26 ∗∗ −88.82 
(0, + 1) 6.559 5.136 7.982 −52.38 −38.63 ∗∗ −69.56 ∗
(-2, + 2) 8.067 3.270 12.86 −93.79 −61.38 ∗∗ −134.3 ∗
(-2,0) 5.171 3.456 6.883 −65.59 −45.43 ∗∗ −90.79 ∗
(0, + 2) 1.683 −.6141 3.981 −62.88 −43.41 ∗∗ −87.21 ∗
(-3, + 3) 11.99 5.093 18.90 −82.49 −53.12 ∗∗ −119.2 
(-3,0) 12.85 8.043 17.66 −58.69 −38.91 −83.42 ∗
(0, + 3) −2.067 −3.374 −.7587 −58.48 −41.67 ∗ −79.49 
(-3, + 10) 11.21 6.451 15.97 −116.3 ∗∗∗ −94.19 ∗∗∗ −144.0 ∗∗∗
(0, + 10) −2.855 −2.017 −3.693 −92.33 ∗∗∗ −82.74 ∗∗ −104.3 ∗∗∗
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Table A4 
Stock market reactions using alternative market index (in %). Notes: This table presents CARs for each bank following the publication of stress test results over the 
2009–2015 period with a (-1,+1) event window using an alternative market index geared towards banks. The banks are divided into global SIFIs, domestic SIFIs, and 
non-SIFIs according to the classification of the Financial Stability Board ( FSB, 2014 ). 
Banks 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Global SIFIs SCAP CCAR CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR 
Bank of Amer. .0719 .0109 .0166 −.0048 −.0036 .0088 .0002 .0197 −.0152 
BNY Mellon .0122 .0182 −.0121 −.0029 .019 ∗∗∗ .0037 .0067 −.0076 .0068 
Citigroup .0134 −.0120 −.0422 .0058 −.0125 .0123 −.0283 −.0064 .0122 
Deutsche Bank −.0018 −.0085 
Goldman Sachs −.0723 .0249 −.0189 .0187 −.05 ∗∗∗ −.0093 .0025 −.0192 .0026 
HSBC −.0322 .0269 −.04 ∗∗∗ −.024 ∗
JPMorgan Ch. −.0503 .0239 .0163 −.0160 .001 −.0005 .0015 −.0116 −.0101 
Morgan Stanley −.1299 .0089 −.0552 −.0049 −.03 ∗∗∗ −.0134 −.0239 −.0026 .0285 ∗
Santander −.0168 .0394 −.0306 −.033 ∗
State Street .0623 .0038 .0159 −.0028 −.025 −.0055 −.0044 −.031 ∗∗ −.0075 
Wells Fargo .0229 −.0016 −.0024 −.0086 .0150 −.0190 .024 ∗∗∗ −.0127 .0092 
Domestic SIFIs 
American Expr. −.0326 .0242 .0087 .0023 −.0003 −.0182 .0058 −.0129 .0080 
BB&T −.0811 ∗ −.0082 −.0155 .0010 −.0019 −.0052 .0080 .0132 .0052 
Capital One .343 ∗∗∗ .001 .002 .044 ∗ −.0209 −.0166 .027 ∗ .0011 .0124 
Fifth Third .437 ∗∗∗ .0156 −.0144 −.0132 −.0094 −.0026 −.0183 .0065 −.0171 
PNC .0781 .0051 −.0116 .0188 .0168 .0003 −.0004 .02 ∗∗ .015 ∗
Regions Fin. −.0453 −.0172 −.0142 −.0025 −.0030 .01 −.0009 .0229 .007 
SunTrust Banks .0317 .0220 −.0121 .0143 .002 −.006 −.008 .019 ∗ .0075 
U.S. Bancorp −.096 ∗∗ −.0024 .0150 .0133 −.04 ∗∗∗ .001 −.0112 .0031 −.015 ∗
Non-SIFIs 
BBVA Compass −.0239 −.0082 −.0122 −.015 
BMO −.0177 .0185 −.0109 −.007 
Comerica .0090 −.0141 .036 ∗∗∗ −.01 
Discover −.0198 .0081 −.0145 .007 
Huntington −.0078 .0047 .0144 .003 
KeyCorp −.145 −.024 −.004 .0157 −.0003 −.005 .0044 029 ∗∗ .0116 
MetLife .1219 .0317 −.09 ∗∗∗
M&T −.0136 .005 .018 ∗∗ .0034 
Northern Trust .009 −.0007 .006 −.002 
Zions Bancorp −.0133 .0109 .0202 .0162 
Table A5 
CDS spreads reactions using alternative market index (in bp). Notes: This table presents CARs for each bank following the publication of stress test results over the 
2009–2015 period with a (-1,+1) event window using an alternative market index geared towards banks. The banks are divided into global SIFIs, domestic SIFIs, and 
non-SIFIs according to the classification of the Financial Stability Board ( FSB, 2014 ). 
Banks 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Global SIFIs SCAP CCAR CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR DFAST CCAR 
Bank of Amer. −80.06 −5.73 −19.47 −.95 −1.75 −1.454 2.053 −1.19 .793 
Citigroup −168 ∗∗∗ −3.49 2.032 −7.36 −5.23 −1.617 2.341 −3.28 1.262 
Goldman Sachs 12.08 −4.44 −14.36 −1.24 −3.35 .554 −1.97 −2.78 1.901 
JPMorgan Ch. −25.75 ∗∗ −2.92 −7.461 −.73 −2.29 −1.99 −1.71 −1.24 1.103 
Morgan Stanley 189 ∗ −6.40 −13.84 −.76 −4.18 −.619 −2.27 −1.81 1.353 
Wells Fargo −71 ∗∗∗ −1.34 −4.94 −2.55 −1.84 .909 −3.08 −1.08 −.05 
Domestic SIFIs 
Ally Financial −143.5 −4.98 −29.8 −5.42 −11.99 −5.99 −.59 2.461 2.85 
American Expr. −56.8 ∗∗ −.44 −.94 −1.36 −3.67 .95 −.18 −.86 −.13 
Capital One −40.6 1.74 −2.80 −2.3 −4.18 −.76 −.92 −1.43 −.099 
Non-SIFIs 
MetLife −13.51 −5.61 −1.015 
Table A6 
Systematic risk using alternative market index. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (3) over the period 2009–2015 using an alternative market 
index geared towards banks. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ − 1%, ∗∗ − 5%, ∗ − 10%. 
2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Market β .9635 ∗∗∗ .9212 ∗∗∗ 1.059 ∗∗∗ 1.081 ∗∗∗ 1.017 ∗∗∗ 1.098 ∗∗∗
(.0151) (.0191) (.0180) (.0285) (.0264) (.0269) 
D A ∗R m −.0642 ∗∗ .0248 .0090 −.0271 −.0381 .0422 
(.1491) (.0445) (.0462) (.0485) (.0426) (.0406) 
D M ∗R m .1361 ∗∗∗
(.0252) 
D R ∗R m −.0407 .0459 −.0294 −.1118 ∗∗∗ −.0960 ∗∗
(.1267) (.0485) (.0454) (.0432) (.0462) 
Number of id 18 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 406 334 445 367 363 
R 2 .6186 .7137 .7190 .5686 .5188 .5342 
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Table A7 
Systemic risk using alternative market index. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (5) over the period 2009–2015 using an 
alternative market index geared towards banks. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 
5%, ∗ - 10%. 
2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Market ρ .7778 ∗∗∗ .8300 ∗∗∗ .8774 ∗∗∗ .8016 ∗∗∗ .7328 ∗∗∗ .7242 ∗∗∗
(.0163) (.0159) (.0168) (.0217) (.0193) (.0165) 
D A ∗ ˜ R m .0584 −.0491 ∗ −.0571 ∗ −.0556 ∗ .0111 .0525 ∗
(.0357) (.0276) (.0320) (.0334) (.0311) (.0277) 
D M ∗ ˜ R m .0611 ∗∗∗
(.0225) 
D R ∗ ˜ R m .0061 −.0462 ∗ −.0263 −.0119 .0514 
(.0206) (.0281) (.0298) (.0296) (.0354) 
Number of id 18 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 406 334 445 367 363 
R 2 .6232 .7154 .7316 .6032 .5353 .5325 
Table A8 
Systematic risk gap and no-gap banks using alternative market index. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (3) over the period 
2009–2015 using an alternative market index geared towards banks. Columns ‘+’ and ‘-’ show the results for banks without and with capital 
shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as 
follows: ∗∗∗ − 1%, ∗∗ − 5%, ∗ − 10%. 
2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) 
Market β .9710 ∗∗∗ .9474 ∗∗∗ 1.065 ∗∗∗ 1.060 ∗∗∗ 1.067 ∗∗∗ 1.084 ∗∗∗ .9972 ∗∗∗ .9884 ∗∗∗ 1.075 ∗∗∗ 1.080 ∗∗∗
(.0143) (.0142) (.0176) (.0167) (.0262) (.0229) (.0249) (.0208) (.0264) (.0222) 
D A ∗R m −.0717 ∗∗∗ −.0481 ∗ .0029 .0080 −.0118 −.0288 −.0176 −.0088 .0649 .0597 
(.0249) (.0250) (.0461) (.0457) (.0479) (.0462) (.0417) (.0395) (.0404) (.0378) 
D R No−gap ∗ R m −.1540 ∗∗∗ .0021 .0211 −.0669 ∗ −.0313 
(.0404) (.0458) (.0423) (.0390) (.0471) 
D R Gap ∗ R m .0812 ∗ .2333 ∗∗∗ −.1173 ∗∗ −.2286 ∗∗∗ −.6448 ∗∗∗
(.0434) (.0779) (.0485) (.0614) (.1281) 
R 2 .6193 .6186 .7189 .7195 .5646 .5646 .5181 .5187 .5335 .5362 
Number of id 18 18 17 28 29 
Trading days 597 334 394 367 363 
Table A9 
Systemic risk gap and no-gap banks using alternative market index. Notes: This table presents the estimation results for Eq. (5) over the period 
2009–2015 using an alternative market index geared towards banks. Columns ‘+’ and ‘-’ show the results for banks without and with capital 
shortfalls and/or disapproval of capital distribution plans, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted 
as follows: ∗∗∗ - 1%, ∗∗ - 5%, ∗ - 10%. 
2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 
( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) ( + ) ( −) 
Market ρ .7785 ∗∗∗ .7828 ∗∗∗ .8730 ∗∗∗ .8628 ∗∗∗ .7856 ∗∗∗ .7911 ∗∗∗ .7168 ∗∗∗ .7381 ∗∗∗ .7185 ∗∗∗ .7399 ∗∗∗
(.0108) (.0119) (.0157) (.0135) (.0188) (.0152) (.0179) (.0146) (.0164) (.0149) 
D A ∗ ˜ R m .0577 ∗ .0534 −.0527 ∗ −.0425 −.0435 −.0490 .0271 .0059 .0582 ∗∗ .0369 
(.0336) (.0339) (.0314) (.0304) (.0320) (.0300) (.0303) (.0284) (.0276) (.0268) 
D R No−gap ∗ ˜ R m .0101 −.0410 −.0034 .0294 .0826 ∗∗
(.0187) (.0256) (.0251) (.0271) (.0368) 
D R Gap ∗ ˜ R m −.0036 −.0359 -.0557 ∗ −.1692 ∗∗∗ −.3082 ∗∗∗
(.0161) (.0343) (.0304) (.0395) (.1024) 
R 2 .6232 .6231 .7314 .7312 .5976 .5977 .5354 .5366 .5328 .5330 
Number of id 18 18 17 28 29 
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